PEACE? No Chance . . .
For the past two decades, Professor Benny
Morris - a prominent Israeli leftist, international academic, kibbutznik,
and a leading figure in Israel's Post-Zionism camp - has been advocating
the notion that Israel's official version of history has been filled
with misconceptions and misleading myths. With the publication of The
Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem in 1988, Professor Benny Morris
became one of Israel’s “New Historians” who forced
his country to confront its partial role in the displacement of hundreds
of thousands of Palestinians. Later, citing moral and ethical reasons,
Morris refused to fulfill his Israeli military duties in the West Bank
and was subsequently arrested and jailed. For the last 20 years he has
been a prominent critic of the State of Israel. More recently, he has
shocked his allies in the Left with his criticism of the Palestinian
liberation movement and its leadership. As the cycle of violence in the
Middle East intensifies, Professor Benny Morris explains in the following
essay why he has shifted the propensity of blame for the breakdown in
negotiations, from Israel to the Palestinian leadership, and expounds
on why he believes a peaceful coexistence is impossible in the near future.
by Professor Benny Morris
The rumor that I have undergone a brain transplant is (as
far as I can remember) unfounded - or at least premature. But my thinking
about the current Middle East crisis and its protagonists has in fact
radically changed during the past two years. I imagine that I feel a
bit like one of those western fellow travellers rudely
awakened by the trundle of Russian tanks crashing through Budapest in
1956.
Back in 1993, when I began work on Righteous Victims, a
revisionist history of the Zionist-Arab conflict from 1881 until the
present, I was cautiously optimistic about the prospects for Middle East
peace. I was never a wild optimist; and my gradual study during the mid-1990s
of the pre-1948 history of Palestinian-Zionist relations brought home
to me the depth and breadth of the problems and antagonisms. But at least
the Israelis and Palestinians were talking peace; had agreed to mutual
recognition; and had signed the Oslo agreement, a first step that promised
gradual Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the emergence
of a Palestinian state, and a peace treaty between the two peoples. The
Palestinians appeared to have given up their decades-old dream and objective
of destroying and supplanting the Jewish state, and the Israelis had
given up their dream of a “Greater Israel”, stretching from
the Mediterranean to the Jordan river. And, given the centrality of Palestinian-Israeli
relations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a final, comprehensive peace
settlement between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors seemed within
reach.
But by the time I had completed the
book, my restrained optimism had given way to grave doubts - and within
a year had crumbled into a cosmic pessimism. One reason was the Syrians’ rejection
of the deal offered by the prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon
Peres in 1993-96 and Ehud Barak in 1999-2000, involving Israeli withdrawal
from the Golan Heights in exchange for a full-fledged bilateral peace
treaty. What appears to have stayed the hands of President Hafez Assad
and subsequently his son and successor, Bashar Assad, was not quibbles
about a few hundred yards here or there but a basic refusal to make
peace with the Jewish state. What counted, in the end, was the presence,
on a wall in the Assads’ office, of a portrait of Saladin, the
legendary 12th-century Kurdish Muslim warrior who had beaten the crusaders,
to whom the Arabs often compared the Zionists. I can see the father,
on his deathbed, telling his son: “Whatever you do, don’t
make peace with the Jews; like the crusaders, they too will
vanish.”
But my main reason, around which my pessimism gathered
and crystallized, was the figure of Yasser Arafat, who has led the Palestinian
national movement since the late 1960s and, by virtue of the Oslo accords,
governs the cities of the West Bank (Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus,
Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqilya) and their environs, and the bulk of the
Gaza Strip. Arafat is the symbol of the movement, accurately reflecting
his people’s miseries and collective aspirations. Unfortunately,
he has proven himself a worthy successor to Haj Muhammad Amin al Husseini,
the mufti of Jerusalem, who led the Palestinians during the 1930s into
their (abortive) rebellion against the British mandate government and
during the 1940s into their (again abortive) attempt to prevent the emergence
of the Jewish state in 1948, resulting in their catastrophic defeat and
the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. Husseini had been implacable
and incompetent (a dangerous mix) - but also a trickster and liar. Nobody
had trusted him, neither his Arab colleagues nor the British nor the
Zionists. Above all, Husseini had embodied rejectionism - a rejection
of any compromise with the Zionist movement. He had rejected two international
proposals to partition the country into Jewish and Arab polities, by
the British Peel commission in 1937 and by the UN General Assembly in
November 1947. In between, he spent the war years (1941-45) in Berlin,
working for the Nazi foreign ministry and recruiting Bosnian Muslims
for the Wehrmacht.
Abba Eban, Israel’s legendary foreign minister, once
quipped that the Palestinians had never missed an opportunity to miss
an opportunity. But no one can fault them for consistency. After Husseini
came Arafat, another implacable nationalist and inveterate liar, trusted
by no Arab, Israeli or American leader (though there appear to be many
Europeans who are taken in). In 1978-79, he failed to join the Israeli-Egyptian
Camp David framework, which might have led to Palestinian statehood a
decade ago. In 2000, turning his back on the Oslo process, Arafat rejected
yet another historic compromise, that offered by Barak at Camp David
in July and subsequently improved upon in President Bill Clinton’s
proposals (endorsed by Barak) in December. Instead, the Palestinians,
in September, resorted to arms and launched the current mini-war or intifada,
which has so far resulted in some 790 Arab and 270 Israeli deaths, and
a deepening of hatred on both sides to the point that the idea of a territorial-political
compromise seems to be a pipe dream.
Palestinians and their sympathizers have blamed the Israelis
and Clinton for what happened: the daily humiliations and restrictions
of the continuing Israeli semi-occupation; the wily but transparent Binyamin
Netanyahu’s foot-dragging during 1996-99; Barak’s continued
expansion of the settlements in the occupied territories and his standoffish
manner toward Arafat; and Clinton’s insistence on summoning the
Camp David meeting despite Palestinian protestations that they were not
quite ready. But all this is really and truly beside the point: Barak,
a sincere and courageous leader, offered Arafat a reasonable peace agreement
that included Israeli withdrawal from 85-91% of the West Bank and 100%
of the Gaza Strip; the uprooting of most of the settlements; Palestinian
sovereignty over the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem; and the establishment
of a Palestinian state. As to the Temple Mount (Haram ash-Sharif) in
Jerusalem’s Old City, Barak proposed Israeli-Palestinian condominium
or UN security council control or “divine sovereignty” with
actual Arab control. Regarding the Palestinian refugees, Barak offered
a token return to Israel and massive financial compensation to facilitate
their rehabilitation in the Arab states and the Palestinian state-to-be.
Arafat rejected the offer, insisting on 100% Israeli withdrawal
from the territories, sole Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount,
and the refugees’ “right of return” to Israel proper.
Instead of continuing to negotiate, the Palestinians - with the agile
Arafat both riding the tiger and pulling the strings behind the scenes
- launched the intifada. Clinton (and Barak) responded by upping the
ante to 94-96% of the West Bank (with some territorial compensation from
Israel proper) and sovereignty over the surface area of the Temple Mount,
with some sort of Israeli control regarding the area below ground, where
the Palestinians have recently carried out excavation work without proper
archaeological supervision. Again, the Palestinians rejected the proposals,
insisting on sole Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount (surely
an unjust demand: after all, the Temple Mount and the temples’ remains
at its core are the most important historical and religious symbol and
site of the Jewish people. It is worth mentioning that “Jerusalem” or
its Arab variants do not even appear once in the Koran).
Since these rejections - which led directly to Barak’s
defeat and hardliner Ariel Sharon’s election as prime minister
- the Israelis and Palestinians have been at each other’s throats,
and the semi-occupation has continued. The intifada is a strange, sad
sort of war, with the underdog, who rejected peace, simultaneously in
the role of aggressor and, when the western TV cameras are on, victim.
The semi-occupier, with his giant but largely useless army, merely responds,
usually with great restraint, given the moral and international political
shackles under which he labors. And he loses on CNN because F-16s bombing
empty police buildings appear far more savage than Palestinian suicide
bombers who take out 10 or 20 Israeli civilians at a go.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has emerged as a virtual
kingdom of mendacity, where every official, from President Arafat down,
spends his days lying to a succession of western journalists. The reporters
routinely give the lies credence equal to or greater than what they hear
from straight, or far less mendacious, Israeli officials. One day Arafat
charges that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) uses uranium-tipped shells
against Palestinian civilians. The next day it’s poison gas. Then,
for lack of independent corroboration, the charges simply vanish - and
the Palestinians go on to the next lie, again garnering headlines in
western and Arab newspapers.
Daily, Palestinian officials bewail Israeli “massacres” and “bombings” of
Palestinian civilians - when in fact there have been no massacres and
the bombings have invariably been directed at empty PA buildings. The
only civilians deliberately targeted and killed in large numbers, indeed
massacred, are Israeli - by Palestinian suicide bombers. In response,
the army and Shin Bet (the Israeli security service) have tried to hit
the guilty with “targeted killings” of bomb-makers, terrorists
and their dispatchers, to me an eminently moral form of reprisal, deterrence
and prevention: these are (barbaric) “soldiers” in a mini-war
and, as such, legitimate military targets. Would the critics prefer Israel
to respond in kind to a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv? Palestinian leaders
routinely laud the suicide bombers as national heroes. In a recent spate
of articles, Palestinian journalists, politicians and clerics praised
Wafa Idris, a female suicide bomber who detonated her device in Jerusalem’s
main Jaffa Street, killing an 81- year-old man and injuring about 100.
A controversy ensued - not over the morality or political efficacy of
the deed but about whether Islam allows women to play such a role.
Instead of being informed, accurately, about the Israeli
peace offers, the Palestinians have been subjected to a nonstop barrage
of anti-Israeli incitement and lies in the PA-controlled media. Arafat
has honed the practice of saying one thing to western audiences and quite
another to his own Palestinian constituency to a fine art. Lately, with
Arab audiences, he has begun to use the term “the Zionist army” (for
the IDF), a throwback to the 1950s and 1960s when Arab leaders routinely
spoke of “the Zionist entity” instead of saying “Israel”,
which, they felt, implied some form of recognition of the Jewish state
and its legitimacy.
At the end of the day, this question of legitimacy - seemingly put to
rest by the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli- Jordanian peace treaties -
is at the root of current Israeli despair and my own “conversion”.
For decades, Israeli leaders - notably Golda Meir in 1969 - denied the
existence of a “Palestinian people” and the legitimacy of
Palestinian aspirations for sovereignty. But during the 1930s and 1940s,
the Zionist movement agreed to give up its dream of a “Greater
Israel” and to divide Palestine with the Arabs. During the 1990s,
the movement went further - agreeing to partition and recognizing the
existence of the Palestinian people as its partner in partition.
Unfortunately, the Palestinian national movement, from
its inception, has denied the Zionist movement any legitimacy and stuck
fast to the vision of a “Greater Palestine”, meaning a Muslim-Arab-populated
and Arab- controlled state in all of Palestine, perhaps with some Jews
being allowed to stay on as a religious minority. In 1988-93, in a brief
flicker on the graph, Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization
seemed to have acquiesced in the idea of a compromise. But since 2000
the dominant vision of a “Greater Palestine” has surged back
to the fore (and one wonders whether the pacific asseverations of 1988-1993
were not merely diplomatic camouflage).
The Palestinian leadership, and with them most Palestinians,
deny Israel’s right to exist, deny that Zionism was/is a just enterprise.
(I have yet to see even a peace-minded Palestinian leader, as Sari Nusseibeh
seems to be, stand up and say: “Zionism is a legitimate national
liberation movement, like our own. And the Jews have a just claim to
Palestine, like we do.”) Israel may exist, and be too powerful,
at present, to destroy; one may recognize its reality. But this is not
to endow it with legitimacy. Hence Arafat’s repeated denial in
recent months of any connection between the Jewish people and the Temple
Mount, and, by extension, between the Jewish people and the land of Israel/Palestine. “What
Temple?” he asks. The Jews are simply robbers who came from Europe
and decided, for some unfathomable reason, to steal Palestine and displace
the Palestinians. He refuses to recognize the history and reality of
the 3,000-year-old Jewish connection to the land of Israel.
On some symbolic plane, the Temple Mount is a crucial issue.
But more practically, the real issue, the real litmus test of Palestinian
intentions, is the fate of the refugees, some 3.5-4 million strong, encompassing
those who fled or were driven out during the 1948 war and were never
allowed back to their homes in Israel, as well as their descendants.
I spent the mid-1980s investigating what led to the creation of the refugee
problem, publishing The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949
in 1988. My conclusion, which angered many Israelis and undermined Zionist
historiography, was that most of the refugees were a product of Zionist
military action and, in smaller measure, of Israeli expulsion orders
and Arab local leaders’ urgings or orders to move out. Critics
of Israel subsequently latched on to those findings that highlighted
Israeli responsibility while ignoring the fact that the problem was a
direct consequence of the war that the Palestinians - and, in their wake,
the surrounding Arab states - had launched. And few noted that, in my
concluding remarks, I had explained that the creation of the problem
was “almost inevitable”, given the Zionist aim of creating
a Jewish state in a land largely populated by Arabs and given Arab resistance
to the Zionist enterprise. The refugees were the inevitable by-product
of an attempt to fit an ungainly square peg into an inhospitable round
hole.
But whatever my findings, we are now 50 years on - and Israel exists.
Like every people, the Jews deserve a state, and justice will not be
served by throwing them into the sea. And if the refugees are allowed
back, there will be godawful chaos and, in the end, no Israel. Israel
is currently populated by 5m Jews and more than 1m Arabs (an increasingly
vociferous, pro-Palestinian irredentist time bomb). If the refugees return,
an unviable binational entity will emerge and, given the Arabs’ far
higher birth rates, Israel will quickly cease to be a Jewish state. Add
to that the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and you have, almost
instantly, an Arab state between the Mediterranean and the Jordan river
with a Jewish minority.
Jews lived as a minority in Muslim countries from the 7th
century - and, contrary to Arab propaganda, never much enjoyed the experience.
They were always second-class citizens and always discriminated-against
infidels; they were often persecuted and not infrequently murdered. Giant
pogroms occurred over the centuries. And as late as the 1940s Arab mobs
murdered hundreds of Jews in Baghdad, and hundreds more in Libya, Egypt
and Morocco. The Jews were expelled from or fled the Arab world during
the 1950s and 60s. There is no reason to believe that Jews will want
to live (again) as a minority in a (Palestinian) Arab state, especially
given the tragic history of Jewish-Palestinian relations. They will either
be expelled or emigrate to the west.
It is the Palestinian leadership’s rejection of the Barak- Clinton
peace proposals of July-December 2000, the launching of the intifada,
and the demand ever since that Israel accept the “right of return” that
has persuaded me that the Palestinians, at least in this generation,
do not intend peace: they do not want, merely, an end to the occupation
- that is what was offered back in July- December 2000, and they rejected
the deal. They want all of Palestine and as few Jews in it as possible.
The right of return is the wedge with which to prise open the Jewish
state. Demography - the far higher Arab birth rate - will, over time,
do the rest, if Iranian or Iraqi nuclear weapons don’t do the trick
first.
And don’t get me wrong. I favor an Israeli withdrawal
from the territories - the semi-occupation is corrupting and immoral,
and alienates Israel’s friends abroad - as part of a bilateral
peace agreement; or, if an agreement is unobtainable, a unilateral withdrawal
to strategically defensible borders. In fact in 1988 I served time in
a military prison for refusing to serve in the West Bank town of Nablus.
But I don’t believe that the resultant status quo will survive
for long. The Palestinians - either the PA itself or various armed factions,
with the PA looking on - will continue to harry Israel, with Katyusha
rockets and suicide bombers, across the new lines, be they agreed or
self-imposed. Ultimately, they will force Israel to reconquer the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, probably plunging the Middle East into a new, wide
conflagration.
I don’t believe that Arafat and his colleagues mean
or want peace - only a staggered chipping away at the Jewish state -
and I don’t believe that a permanent two-state solution will emerge.
I don’t believe that Arafat is constitutionally capable of agreeing,
really agreeing, to a solution in which the Palestinians get 22-25% of
the land (a West Bank-Gaza state) and Israel the remaining 75- 78%, or
of signing away the “right of return”. He is incapable of
looking his refugee constituencies in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Gaza
in the eye and telling them: “I have signed away your birthright,
your hope, your dream.”
And he probably doesn’t want to. Ultimately, I believe,
the balance of military force or the demography of Palestine, meaning
the discrepant national birth rates, will determine the country’s
future, and either Palestine will become a Jewish state, without a substantial
Arab minority, or it will become an Arab state, with a gradually diminishing
Jewish minority. Or it will become a nuclear wasteland, a home to neither
people.
Professor Benny Morris teaches Middle East history
at Ben-Gurion University, Beersheba, Israel. His next book, The Road
to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, the Jews and Palestine, is published by
IB Tauris.
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